A Generalization of Hume’s Thesis by Woleński, Jan
 Philosophia Scientiæ
Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences 
10-1 | 2006
Jerzy Kalinowski : logique et normativité
A Generalization of Hume’s Thesis
Jan Woleński
Electronic version
URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/494
DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.494
ISSN: 1775-4283
Publisher
Éditions Kimé
Printed version
Date of publication: 1 April 2006
Number of pages: 109-115
ISBN: 2-84174-392-6
ISSN: 1281-2463
 
Electronic reference
Jan Woleński, « A Generalization of Hume’s Thesis », Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 10-1 | 2006, Online
since 10 June 2011, connection on 08 May 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
philosophiascientiae/494  ; DOI : 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.494 
Tous droits réservés
A Generalization of Hume’s Thesis1
Jan Woleński
Université de Krakow (Pologne)
More specifically, I will consider the Hume thesis concerning the
is/ought relation. This reservation is essential, because we have also ano-
ther thesis stated by Hume, namely the principle (roughly speaking) that
sets with the same cardinality have the same number of elements. Hume’s
thesis about the is/ought relation is expressed in the following way :
1An extended version of this paper is forthcoming in [Woleński 2006] under the
same title.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 10 (1), 2006, 109–115.
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“I cannot forbear adding to those reasonings an observation,
which ma, perhaps be found of some importance”. In every
system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in
the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a
God, or makes observations concerning human affairs ; when
of a sudden I am surpris’d to find, that instead of usual co-
pulations of propositions, is, and not, I meet with no propo-
sition that is not connected with an ought, or ought not. This
change is imperceptible ; but is, however, of the last conse-
quence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new
relation or affirmation, ’ts necessary that it shou’d be obser-
ved and explain’d ; and at the same time that a reason should
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others, which are enti-
rely different from it.” [Hume 1951, 469]
Perhaps it is important to note that the quoted fragment says nothing
about the relation between norms as specific linguistic utterances and
declarative sentences. In particular, Hume did not characterize ought-
sentences as norms or imperatives. He only contrasted two kinds of co-
pulations, relations or affirmations, one expressed by “is” and “is not” and
another, which is expressed by “ought” and “ought not”. What Hume does
in his statement, consists in pointing out that ought-sentences are not
deducible (“seems altogether inconceivable how this new relation can be
deduced from others, which are entirely different from it”).
A similar question was considered by Poincaré in his essay about
morality and science.2 According to Poincaré, a correct logical inference
with an imperative as its conclusion requires an imperative premise.3
However, this metalogical rule is defined for a language in which occurs
imperatives and declarative sentences, not only the latter. Thus, there is
an essential difference between Hume and Poincaré in their approaches to
the is/ought problem. I will take Hume’s pattern. My aim is to generalize
the Hume’s thesis for a broad class of modal sentences, that is the variety
which includes at least deontic, epistemic and interrogative modalities.
I start with deontic modalities for which the Hume thesis was origi-
nally formulated. As usually, by deontic sentences I understand instantia-
tions of the following schematic formulas (A is an arbitrary non-deotnic
sentential expression) : OA — it is obligatory that A ; FA — is prohi-
2See [Poincaré 1910], chapter 8.
3This principle was implicitly adopted by Aristotle in his treatment of normative
syllogisms as reconstructed [Kalinowski 1953, 163–173].
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bited (forbidden that A) ; PA — it is permitted that A. I assume the
standard deontic logic, which validates the following equivalences (as de-
finitions) : FA ⇔ O¬A ; OA ⇔ O¬A ; PA ⇔ ¬O¬A ; OA ⇔ ¬P¬A ;
PA⇔ ¬FA ; FA⇔ ¬PA. These dependencies generate the wellknown
logical square (or square of oppositions) (D) for deontic sentences (it is
isomorphic with the logical square for alethic modal sentences) (see Fig.
1 5 on page 111).
? ?
??
Fig. 1 – (D)
The interpretation : α−OA, β−FA, γ−PA, δ−P¬A. We have the
following facts (the symbol ⊢ indicates that the formula occurring after
it is a logical theorem) :
(1) ⊢ ¬(α ∧ β) (obligation and prohibition are contraries) ;
(2) ⊢ (α⇒ γ) (obligation entails permission) ;
(3) ⊢ (β ⇒ δ) (prohibition entails permission not) ;
(4) ⊢ (α⇔ ¬δ) (obligation and permission not are contradictories) ;
(5) ⊢ (β ⇔ ¬γ) (prohibition and permission are contradictories) ;
(6) ⊢ (γ ∨ δ) (permission and permission not are complementaries).
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The Hume thesis cannot be formulated within (D), because it concerns
the relation between A and OA. More precisely, the Hume’s thesis asserts
(*) ¬ ⊢ (A⇒ OA). We should consider another diagram, namely (D1)
(see Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2 – (D1)
The point κ is for A, the point λ for ¬A, the point ν for α ∨ β (that
is, OA ∨ FA ; normative determination, symbolically DA) and µ for
γ∧δ (that is, PA∧ .P¬A ; normative indifference ; symbolically IA). We
have new theorems, namely α ⇒ ν (obligation entails determination) ;
β ⇒ ν (prohibition entail determination) ; µ ⇒ γ (indifference entails
permission) ; µ⇒ δ (indifference entails permission not). However, (D1)
does not suggest anything about validity of (*). Moreover, we have also
questions concerning the status of (a) α ⇒ κ, that is, OA ⇒ A ; (b)
κ⇒ γ, that is, A⇒ PA ; (c) γ ⇒ κ, that is, PA⇒ A, and similarly, for
β, λ and δ ; (d) κ⇒ ν ; (e) ν ⇒ κ, (e) κ⇒ µ ; (f) µ⇒ κ, and similarly,
for λ and µ. These formulas are not proper for deontic logic, although
alethic counterparts of (a) and (b) are valid.
In order to investigate the problem, one must appeal to semantics.
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The best tools are provided by possible world semantics. Not entering
too deeply into formal details, let as assume that we have the ordered
triple (Kripke frame) S =< K,W ∗, R >, where K is a non-empty set of
items called possible worlds,W ∗ is a distinguished element of K, usually
interpreted as the real world, and R is a binary relation defined on K
(the accessibility or alternativeness relation). S is a deontic frame if and
only if R is not reflexive, that is, it is not generally true that WRW . In
particular, we assume that not W ∗RW ∗. This assumption immediately
excludes (a) as not a tautology of deontic logic. Now we define : OA is
true in W ∗ if and only if A is true in every world W such that WRW ∗.
Intuitively, the sentence “it is obligatory that A” is true in the real world
W ∗ if and only if A in true in every worldW being a deontic alternative
to W ∗, that is, in the world which all obligations valid in the real world
are satisfied. Accordingly, the sentence PA is true in W* if and only if
there is a world W such that WRW* and A is true in W.4 These intuitive
constraints exclude (*), (b) – (f) as deontic tautologies.5 In the light of
this analysis the Hume thesis can be generalized to the statement (the
letter N denotes one of the symbols O, F, P, P¬ ; moreover, if N is F
or P¬, then A is to be replaced by ¬A outside of the given deontic
operator) :
(GHT)(a) ¬ ⊢ A⇒ NA ;
(b) ¬ ⊢ NA⇒ A.
I will call (GHTa) as the simple Hume thesis, and (GHTb) as the converse
Hume thesis. The particular cases of both are summarized by the follo-
wing list :
(7) ¬ ⊢ (A⇒ OA) (the simple Hume thesis for
obligation) ;
(8) ¬ ⊢ (¬A⇒ FA) (the simple Hume thesis for
prohibition) ;
(9) ¬ ⊢ (OA⇒ A) (the converse Hume thesis for
obligation) ;
(10) ¬ ⊢ (FA⇒ ¬A) (the converse Hume thesis for
4The truth-conditions for FA, P¬A, DA and IA follow immediately from the
deﬁnitions for OA and PA.
5Some instances of (b) and (c) are valid. If A is a tautology, A ⇒ PA, PA ⇒ A
and OA ⇒ A are universally true. Moreover, if something is obligatory and A is a
tautology, then A ⇒ OA is also valid. However, (*), (a) – (c) are not universally
valid.
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prohibition) ;
(11) ¬ ⊢ (A⇒ PA) (the simple Hume thesis for
permission) ;
(12) ¬ ⊢ (¬A⇒ P¬A) (the simple Hume thesis for
permission not) ;
(13) ¬ ⊢ (PA⇒ A) (the converse Hume thesis for
permission) ;
(14) ¬ ⊢ (P¬A⇒ ¬A) (the converse Hume thesis for
permission not) ;
(15) ¬ ⊢ (A⇒ DA) (the first simple Hume thesis for
determination) ;
(16) ¬ ⊢ (¬A⇒ DA) (the second simple Hume thesis for
determination) ;
(17) ¬ ⊢ (DA⇒ A) (the first converse Hume thesis for
determination) ;
(18) ¬ ⊢ (DA⇒ ¬A) (the second converse Hume thesis for
determination) ;
(19) ¬ ⊢ (A⇒ IA) (the first simple Hume thesis for
indifference) ;
(20) ¬ ⊢ (¬A⇒ IA) (the second simple Hume thesis for
indifference) ;
(21) ¬ ⊢ (IA⇒ A) (the first converse Hume thesis for
indifference) ;
(22) ¬ ⊢ (IA⇒ ¬A) (the second converse Hume thesis for
indifference).
It is possible to go further. If we assume normal modal logic, (a) holds
for necessity, but (b) for possibility. The converse of (a) is valid only for
very special modal logics, but (c) invalid everywhere. However, alethic
modal logic is an exception as far as the matter concerns (a) and (b).
Most modal contexts behaves like deontic sentences and satisfies (GTM).
Thus, the sentence A does not entail “I believe (ask, suppose, assert, etc.)
that A. The converse dependence holds neither. There are some dubious
case. For example, according to the classical definition of knowledge, the
sentence “I know that A” entails A. On Frege’s account of assertion,
its logical force demands that “I assert A” entails A. I am inclined to
think that these account are not correct. The logical entailment from “I
know that A” to A cannot be justified by definition only. It requires a
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semantic basis. Of course, it is possible to give it, but the principle “if I
know that A, then ¬A is possible” seems to be more plausible. Frege’s
account of assertion is open to a similar criticism. If these remarks are
right, (GHT) is a very general principle, which is fairly important for
many philosophical issues. Let me mention only that this thesis very
strongly challenges naturalism in epistemology.
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